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COMMENTS
DUTY OF LANDOWNER OR OCCUPIER TO FIREMEN
DISCHARGING THEIR DUTIES
The law places those who come upon the premises of another in three
classes: invitees, licensees and trespassers. Upon such classification depends
the degree of care that must be exercised toward each by the landowner
or occupier.'
In the majority of jurisdictions, the rule is that in the absence of a
statute or municipal ordinance, a member of a public fire department
who, in an emergency, enters a building in the exercise of his duties is a
mere licensee under a permission to enter given by law.2 However, there is
authority to the effect that a fireman, under certain circumstances, may
be considered an invitee.3
As a general rule, a person is a "licensee," as that term is used in the
law of negligence, where his entry or use of the premises is permitted,
expressly or impliedly, by the owner or person in control thereof.4 The
licensee takes the premises as he finds them and the possessor is under no
obligation to make the premises safe for his reception. However, the
possessor must warn him of any latent defects or of any dangerous change
in the condition of the premises of which he actually knows. 5
The "invitee" may be defined as a person who goes on the premises of
another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or
occupant or for their mutual advantage." The invitee is placed upon a
higher footing than is the licensee in that the owner or occupant owes
the invitee the duty of exercising reasonable care to keep the property in
a safe condition. 7
A. RECOVERY DENIED
Firemen have been denied recovery on various bases, perhaps the most
prevalent of which is that they qualify only as licensees and that the facts
I E.g., Haley v. Deer, 135 Neb. 459, 282 N.W. 389 (1938).
2 Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459 (1910);
Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203 (1910); Gibson v.
Leonard, 143 111. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892).
3 Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W. 2d 892 (1954); Clink-
scales v. Mundkowski, 183 Okla. 12, 79 P. 2d 562 (1938); Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery,
229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
4 E.g., Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 16 Wash. 2d 424, 133 P. 2d 797
(1943).
5 Prosser, Torts § 77 (2d ed., 1955).
6 E.g., Wilson v. Goodrich, 218 Iowa 462, 252 N.W. 142 (1934).
7 E.g., Olderman v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 125 Conn. 177, 4 A. 2d 646 (1939).
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of the case fail to support the contention that the defendant has been
guilty of the breach of any common-law duty owed a licensee."
In Anderson v. Cinnamon,9 for example, plaintiff was injured when the
porch of an apartment building owned by the defendants collapsed while
he and other firemen fighting a fire in the building were on the porch.
One of the defendants was on the premises during the fire but did not
know the firemen were going on the porch before they did so. In denying
recovery to the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Missouri said:
... The duty of a possessor of land to firemen is the same as to licensees, who
enter with his permission. Firemen enter under a license given by law, primarily
for the benefit of the public generally, although the possessor may also be bene-
fitted by their work .... [T]he licensee takes the premises as he finds them, ex-
cept for wantonness or some form of intentional wrong as active negligence of
the possessor.'0
The Nebraska Supreme Court referred to a fireman or individual fight-
ing a fire on the premises of an owner or occupant as a "bare licensee" to
whom the owner or occupant owes no greater duty then to refrain from
injuring him by wilful or wanton negligence or a designed injury or by
a hidden danger or peril known to the owner or occupant but unknown
to or unobservable by the fireman in the exercise of ordinary care." The
decedent in this case was a professional, paid fireman who volunteered to
serve with a group of volunteer firemen.
In an earlier Nebraska case, on identical facts and arising out of the same
fire,12 the plaintiff was a member of the volunteer group that the decedent
in the later case had volunteered to help. In other words, the later decision
involved a fireman who volunteered, while the earlier involved a volun-
teer fireman. In any event, the defendant was making a trailer tank de-
livery of gasoline and fuel oil to bulk receiving tanks of an oil association
at the latter's plant when a fire broke out on the truck. The unit was
driven down the road where it continued to burn. The volunteer fire de-
8 Anderson v. Cinnamon, 282 S.W. 2d 445 (Mo., 1955); Wax v. Co-operative Refinery
Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W. 2d 707 (1951); Mulcrone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478,
4 N.W. 2d 97 (1942); Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E. 2d
1008 (1936); Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 At. 44 (1925); Clark v. Boston &
M.R.R., 78 N.H. 428, 101 Ad. 795 (1917); Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co.,
158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459 (1910); Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316,
110 Pac. 203 (1910); New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co. v. Anderson,
73 Neb. 84, 102 N.W. 89 (1905); Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N.E. 1113 (1893);
Gibson v. Leonard, 143 I1. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892); Todd v. Armour & Co., 44 Ga. App.
609, 162 S.E. 394 (1932); Volluz v. East St. Louis Light & Power Co., 210 Il. App. 565(1918).
9 282 S.W. 2d 445 (Mo., 1955).
10 Ibid., at 447.
t Wax v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W. 2d 707 (1951).
12 Fentress v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 149 Neb. 355, 31 N.W. 2d 225 (1948).
COMMENTS
partment of which the plaintiff was a member was summoned to fight the
fire. The plaintiff, an experienced fire fighter with knowledge of oil fires
and explosions, was injured when the trailer tank exploded. Although the
court made no attempt to assign to the plaintiff a formal status as licensee
or other, it denied recovery on the ground that ". . . in the absence of any
statute or ordinance prescribing a duty on the part of the owner of prem-
ises to members of a public fire department, the owner is not liable for
injuries to such fireman except those proximately resulting from will-
ful or wanton negligence or a designed injury,"13 citing with approval the
case of New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co. v. Anderson.1 4
In the Minnesota decision of Mulcrone v. Wagner, a member of the
St. Paul bureau of fire prevention was injured when he stumbled on a
faulty stair tread and fell down a stairway in the defendant's building while
making a fire inspection of the premises. 5 Firemen were held to be
licensees. Following the rule laid down forty-two years earlier in Hamil-
ton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co.,16 the court said that the owner or oc-
cupant of a building owes no duty to keep it in a reasonably safe condi-
tion for members of a public -fire department who might, in the exercise
of their duties, have occasion to enter the building. It is ineresting to
note that both the Hamilton and Mulcrone courts considered the rule
harsh but that they agreed it was up to the legislature and not the judiciary
to change it.
A Worcester fireman, who was injured when he fell from a defective
fire escape on the defendant's building, which fire escape he was using as a
vantage point from which to fight a fire in a nearby building, was denied
recovery on the ground that the entry of a fireman upon a premises is by
virtue of a permission implied by law and constitutes him a licensee. Con-
sequently, the plaintiff could not recover on the ground of ordinary negli-
gence but was required to show wilful, wanton or reckless conduct in
the absence of a violation of a statute.17
In Clark v. Boston & M.R.R.,'18 a fireman injured while fighting a fire
set by the defendant's locomotive was denied recovery. The court con-
strued the plaintiff's connection with the fire to have arisen solely from
his own act in coming into contact with it after it was set, and termed him
an "intervenor" to whom one who created the situation owed no "antici-
patory duty." The court likened the situation to that of a "land owner
and licensee."
13 Ibid., at 227. 14 73 Neb. 84, 102 N.W. 89 (1905).
15 212 Minn. 478, 4 N.W. 2d 97 (1942).
16 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899).
17 Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E. 2d 1008 (1936).
18 78 N.H. 428, 101 At. 795 (1917).
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Another case where a fireman was termed a licensee and recovery de-
nied was that of Pennbaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co.19 The
intestate was killed while fighting a fire, by contact with wires of the de-
fendant lighting company in the back yard of the burning premises. It did
not appear that the defendants had any exact knowledge of the location
of the fire,20 and the current which killed the decedent was one which
would not ordinarily endanger life. The defendant was held not negligent
so as to make it liable for the decedent's death because it had no actual
knowledge that the fire had felled dangerous wires. The court, in defining
the defendant's duty, said that "[i]n the absence of ordinance or statute
changing the common-law rule in this regard, a fireman entering a build-
ing under imperative public necessity is but a licensee, who assumes the
risks as he finds them, and to whom the owner of the premises owes no
special duty to maintain these premises in a safe condition."2' 1
Even the fact that the defendant himself turned in the alarm has been
held not to constitute the fireman who responds an invitee.22 In a well-
reasoned decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the right of a
fireman to enter the premises is created by law and exists before the alarm
is sounded, and that, "[w]hen the right to enter is dependent upon an in-
vitation, express or implied, that creates the right to enter, and without
the invitation the right does not exist. Hence as an alarm does not create
the right to enter, and the right exists independent of the alarm, it cannot
be an invitation. a23 The court concluded that firemen are only licensees
and that there is ordinarily no duty to a licensee except to refrain from
Wilful or wanton injury to him and to use reasonable care to prevent
injury to him after discovering his danger.
The owner of a building on which twelve firemen were standing while
engaged in extinguishing a fire therein when the roof gave way and car-
ried all of them to their deaths in the basement below was also absolved
of liability on the licensee theory, the court saying that "[tlhe owner
19 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459 (1910).
20 They knew within a wide area where it was located but the court felt that to re-
uire the defendant to turn off the lights and power in such a wide area during a night
re such as this might cause damage from panic greater than the fire damage it was
sought to prevent.
21 Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 112 Pac. 459, 463
(1910). Accord: New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co. v. Anderson, 73
Neb. 84, 102 N.W. 89 (1905).
22 Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203 (1910). The de-
fendant, on seeing nitric acid fumes resembling smoke emitted from the etching room
of its establishment, turned in a fire alarm and plaintiff's husband, a fireman, went into
the room and there breathed the fumes of the acid causing his ultimate death from trau-
matic pneumonia.
' Ibid., at 206,
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of a building in a populous city does not owe it as a duty, at common
law, independent of any statute or ordinance, to keep such building safe
for firemen, or other officers who in a contingency may enter the same
under a license conferred by law."'2 4
Members of fire insurance patrols and fire insurance salvage corps units
have been held to share the licensee status of firemen. In Illinois, for in-
stance, a member of the Chicago fire insurance patrol was injured through
the faulty operation of an elevator on the defendant's premises while he
was in the building to spread tarpaulins on the defendant's goods and
thereby prevent water damage to them. The plaintiff was deemed a "mere
licensee" and denied recovery.25 A member of the Fire Insurance Salvage
Corps of Baltimore who, while on the premises where a fire had originated
to save property endangered by fire, fell into an open and unguarded
elevator shaft and was injured, was accorded the same treatment.2 6
Other courts, though often reluctant to clearly define the status of fire-
men have denied recovery on various other grounds.27
In the recent case of Gannon v. Royal Properties,28 for example, a gaso-
line explosion in a burning garage was held not to be an "unusual hazard"
the knowledge of the existence of which would impose upon the owner
the duty to give warning of the peril to firemen entering the building
to extinguish the fire. Gasoline, said the court, is known by everybody to
be stored about a garage.
"Considerations of public policy" prevented the predication of any lia-
bility of a property owner to a fireman upon negligence causing a fire in
Suttie v. Sun Oil Co.29 The property owner whose own negligence caused
the fire, it was reasoned, may otherwise be tempted to defer calling the
fire department and help himself until perhaps greater danger to the pub-
lic would be threatened. Public policy, said the court, requires firemen to
look to their employer for proper compensation for injuries.
2 4 Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N.E. 1113, 1117 (1893).
25 Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892).
26 Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 Atd. 44 (1925).
27 Gannon v. Royal Properties, 285 App. Div. 131, 136 N.Y.S. 2d 129 (1954); Fentress
v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 149 Neb. 355, 31 N.W. 2d 225 (1948); Buckeye Cotton
Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646 (1922); Glander v. Milwaukee Elec-
tric R. & Light Co., 155 Wis. 381, 144 N.W. 972 (1914); Litch v. White, 160 Cal. 497,
117 Pac. 515 (1911); Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co., 71 N.J.L. 358, 59 At. 23 (S. Ct., 1904);
Eckes v. Stetler, 98 App. Div. 76, 90 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1904); Baker v. Otis Elevator
Co., 78 App. Div. 513, 79 N.Y. Supp. 663 (1903); Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg.
Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899); Woods v. Miller, 30 App. Div. 232, 52 N.Y. Supp.
217 (1898); Behler v. Daniels, 19 R.I. 49, 31 Ad. 582 (1895); Suttie v. Sun Oil Co., 15
Pa. D. & C. 3 (1931).
28285 App. Div. 131, 136 N.Y.S. 2d 129 (1954).
29 15 Pa. D. & C. 3 (1931). Actually, the doctrine of assumption of risk as well as con-
siderations of public policy defeated the plaintiff's claim here.
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A city fireman under no duty to look after fires outside city limits, has
been termed an invitee as to a property owner outside the city limits who
requests his aid in fighting a fire.80 The property owner was held bound to
use reasonable care to invitees and warn of latent dangers of which he had
knowledge. However, since the defect involved here was deemed patent
and because of the presence of conjecture as to the exact cause of the
accident, liability was not imposed on the defendant.
The presence of contributory negligence will, of course, preclude re-
covery,3' nor will the defendant be held liable when the plaintiff is injured
where there could be no reasonable expectation of his presence,32 or
where it does not appear that he entered by any way which was reason-
able to anticipate he would take. 3
Where the plaintiff is deemed not one of the class of persons for whose
benefit a statute was passed, he cannot predicate liability for his injury on
violation of that statute;34 nor can one not vested with a remedy by virtue
of a statute bring an action thereon in his own name.3 5
B. RECOVERY ALLOWED
One of the leading cases in the minority group that allows recovery for
firemen is the New York case of Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery,36 an action
for personal injuries by the chief of the Dunkirk, New York, fire depart-
ment. Over its property from the street in front, beside its building, giving
access to a stable in the rear, the defendant had built a paved driveway.
Back, 150 feet, across half of this pavement, ran an unguarded coal hole.
The driveway was used by the defendant and by those who had business
with it. One evening the barn caught fire. The plaintiff walked up the un-
lighted driveway to get to the barn, fell into the hole, and was injured.
The court did not clearly define the status of firemen in that it specifically
denied that the plaintiff was a trespasser or a licensee yet seemed reluctant
30 Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646 (1922).
81 Glander v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co., 155 Wis. 381,144 N.W. 972 (1914).
3s Litch v. White, 169 Cal. 497, 117 Pac. 515 (1911). There was no duty on the build-
ing owner to maintain his awnings strong enough for firemen to walk on. Accord:
Woods v. Miller, 30 App. Div. 232, 52 N.Y. Supp. 217 (1898). The plaintiff, while
groping his way in dense smoke, on the roof of a burning building, stepped over a low
parapet or coping and fell into an opening on the premises of the adjoining owner, the
defendant. Prosser, Business Visitors & Invitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573, 610 (1942).
38 Baker v. Otis Elevator Co., 78 App. Div. 513, 79 N.Y. Supp. 663 (1903).
34 Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co., 71 N.J.L. 358, 59 Atl. 23 (S. Ct., 1904). Elevator shafts
are required to be guarded for the benefit of employees, not firemen; Behler v. Daniels,
19 R.I. 49, 31 Ad. 582 (1895); Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892).
85 Eckes v. Stetler, 98 App. Div. 76, 90 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1904). The remedy was held
to be vested in the board of fire commissioners or in the fire commissioner, but not
in an individual fireman.
36 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
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to place its holding on the factor of implied invitation. However, it was
held that the duty of "reasonable care under all the circumstances" existed
and was owing to the plaintiff. The decision was expressly limited to "...
the case of one not a licensee, entering business property as of right over
a way prepared as a means of access for those entitled to enter, who is in-
jured by the negligence of the owner in failing to keep that way in a
reasonably safe condition for those using it as it was intended to be
used." 7
Other cases that have allowed recovery to firemen have proceeded upon
the theory that firemen are invitees and that the defendant has breached
the common-law duty owed an invitee.38
In Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co.39 the plaintiff, a volunteer fire-
man, was invited upon the defendant's premises to deliver and put into
operation a sump pump which the defendant had purchased from the fire
department with the understanding that the department would deliver
and install the pump in working order. Carbon monoxide gas inhaled by
the plaintiff while he was helping to install the pump caused a heart ail-
ment known as a myocardial infarction. The court held that the plaintiff
was on the premises as an invitee, but more specifically as a "business
visitor."40
In Clinkscales v. Mundkowski4' the deceased, though not a member of
the city fire department, was serving with it when killed while fighting a
fire on the defendant's farm outside the city. The court held that the de-
ceased was an invitee of the defendant and allowed recovery because the
defendant had violated his duty of ordinary care.
Taylor v. Palmetto Theater Co. 42 involved a situation wherein the plain-
tiff, while in the performance of his duties as a fireman and fighting a fire
in buildings adjacent to the defendant's, fell into a pit maintained by the
defendant in a passageway. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged an invi-
tation extended to the general public to use the passageway and that he
entered thereon as a member of the general public, although in the dis-
charge of his duties as a fireman, and was, therefore, an invitee or licensee.
The court sustained the complaint and said that simply because the plain-
tiff was a fireman and in the discharge of his duties as such should not
37 Ibid., at 493.
38 Zuercher v. Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W. 2d 892 (1954); Clink-
scales v. Mundkowski, 183 Okla. 12, 79 P. 2d 562 (1938).
39243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W. 2d 892 (1954).
4 0 The term is defined in 65 C.J.S. § 43 (1) as "a person who is invited or permitted
to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indi-
rectly connected with business dealings between them."
41 183 Okla. 12, 79 P. 2d 562 (1938).
42204 S.C. 1, 28 S.E. 2d 538 (1943).
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limit his cause of action to the right or permission to enter the premises
extended by law. The inference was that if, on trial, the plaintiff could
prove that the general public used the passageway with the defendant's
knowledge and consent, he can recover as an invitee or licensee.43
At least one court felt that firemen should enjoy a status all their own.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Sbypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products
Co. 44 said that firemen, entering upon the premises of another in response
to a call of duty are not trespassers, licensees or invitees. They have a status
sui generis since they enter under license of law to perform a duty owed
to the public and the landowner's consent to entry is immaterial.4 5
Some courts, even though they went along with the majority holding
that firemen are licensees, have allowed them recovery because the de-
fendant was guilty of a breach of the common-law duty owed licensees. 46
In referring to firemen as "gratuitous licensees," the court in James v.
Cities Service Oil Co. 47 held that if a fireman is exposed to a "hidden dan-
ger" of which the owner knows, it is the owner's duty to notify the fire-
man unless the fireman has knowledge of the danger or has had reasonable
opportunity to discover the same. This case involved the explosion of a
gasoline storage tank that occurred after the defendant's employees had
fled, without warning the firemen who arrived on the scene of certain
dangerous conditions that they knew existed therein.
In a separate decision, the city whose firemen responded to that fire was
allowed reimbursement for wages, and medical and hospital expenses paid
the injured firemen on the ground that the same duty was owed by the
defendant to the city as licensees as was owed to the firemen as licensees
and that the doctrine of "hidden dangers" applied equally to both.48
The possession of quantities of flammable liquids in excess of those
allowed by city ordinance has been held to constitute wilful and wanton
conduct that amounts to a violation of the duty owed a fireman, though
only a licensee by operation of law, killed by a flashback of the burning
liquid. 49
Similarly, where a railroad company delivering a freight car containing
fireworks, and with knowledge of its contents and its liability to explode
43 The factual situation and treatment of this case bear a strong resemblance to those
involved in the Meiers case, supra note 36.
44 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W. 2d 549 (1951).
45 Ibid.
4 6 James v. Cities Service Oil Co., 66 Ohio App. 87, 31 N.E. 2d 872 (1939); Bandosz v.
Daigger & Co., 255 Il1. App. 494 (1930); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. O'Leary,
136 S.W. 601 (Tex. Civ. App., 1911).
4766 Ohio App. 87, 31 N.E. 2d 872 (1939).
4 8 City of Youngstown v. Cities Service Oil Co., 66 Ohio App. 97, 31 N.E. 2d 876
(1940).
49 Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., 255 i11. App. 494 (1930).
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from concussion, placed the car at a place in its yards where it would be
subjected to impact from other cars and a fire broke out in the car, the
railroad was held liable for the death of a fireman who responded and was
killed in an ensuing explosion of the car. 50 Though the fireman was
termed a licensee, ..... where a person is rightfully upon the premises of
another, even as licensee, he has the right to require of the proprietor
that he so conduct himself as not to injure him through his active negli-
gence.""' Another case in the same jurisdiction thirty years later was said
to involve similar facts and to be controlled by the same rule of law, ex-
cept that the plaintiff was held not to be a licensee as to the defendant.
However, here too, recovery was allowed.52
A New Jersey decision that classified the decedent fireman a licensee
nonetheless refused to absolve the defendant of liability because the latter
was not a landowner. 53 The court felt that the exemption of the land-
owner from liability as to trespassers and licensees is necessary to secure
him the beneficial use of his land, but that no reason exists for extending
the exemption to the case where the rights of the defendant have not been
interfered with. The plaintiff was electrocuted when he went up into the
tower of the city hall to extinguish a fire that had broken out there and
came into contact with a metal pipe which, unknown to him, was charged
with a deadly current of electricity that had escaped from wires installed
and maintained by the defendant electric company for the purpose of
furnishing light from its street lighting system to lamps in the tower. The
decedent was not upon property either owned or conrolled by the defend-
ant at the time of the occurrence.
Another fireman electrocuted by coming into contact with wires of the
defendant utility company, here in a public alley, was held entitled to a
"high degree of care" by those operating electric light and power lines.
54
Liability for death or injury of firemen has, on occasion, been success-
fully predicated upon violation of a statutory duty.55
In Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp.,50 the defendant, in violation of a
5o Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. O'Leary, 136 S.W. 601 (Tex. Civ. App., 1911).
51 Ibid., at 602.
52Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens, 156 S.W. 2d 1010 (Tex. Civ. App., 1949). The de-
fendant gas company failed to cut off the gas supply to a burning building in time to
avert an injury to the plaintiff, a fireman directing a hose stream therein from the curb
line.
5 5Barnett v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 87 N.J.L. 29, 93 At. 108 (S. Ct., 1915).
Accord: City of Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 145 La. 680, 82 So. 785
(1919).
54 Gannon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 145 Mo. 520, 47 S.V. 907 (1898).
55 Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E. 2d 296 (1937); Drake v.
Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 85 Ad. 14 (1912).
56 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E. 2d 296 (1937).
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New York city ordinance, maintained a paint shop in the subcellar of its
hotel wherein were stored large quantities of paints and other explosive
liquids. A fire broke out in the subcellar and the city fire department was
called. Plaintiff's intestate, a fireman, was killed by an explosion in the
paint room. The court, in allowing recovery for his wrongful death based
on violation of the ordinance, held that the ordinance had been enacted
for the benefit of firemen as well as for hotel guests.
A Pennsylvania statute requiring that elevator shafts be kept closed and
guarded was involved in the case of Drake v. Fenton57 where the plaintiff,
a Philadelphia fireman, was injured when he fell through an open and un-
guarded elevator shaft in a warehouse owned and occupied by the defend-
ant. In holding that there was no liability on the defendant at common
law because the plaintiff was a licensee, the court defined the statute vio-
lated by the defendant as one intended to afford protection to city officers
such as firemen, who at any time may be required to come on the premises.
Where a dangerous condition exists in a building to the knowledge of
the owner or his agent, presenting an "unusual peril" to persons entering
thereon, it is the duty of the owner, if he had the opportunity, to give
warning of the peril to firemen about to enter the building in response to
an alarm of fire therein.58
Similarly, the doctrine of assumption of risk has been held inapplicable
to "hidden, unknown and ultrahazardous dangers" encountered by fire-
men on the premises in response to an alarm, although it is contemplated
that firemen encounter those risks ordinarily incidental to extinguishing
fires.59
The storage of a large quantity of explosive powder within city limits
has been held to represent a "public nuisance" and render the possessor
liable for the death of a city fireman killed by an explosion of the powder
while fighting a fire on the premises.60
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the foregoing decisions leads one to conclude that the
courts, in cases of this type, are striving for a legal and equitable balance
between the rights of the landowner or occupier of land and the rights
of one lawfully upon his premises.
57 237 Pa. 8,85 Ad. 14 (1912).
5s Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 284 N.Y. 397, 31 N.E. 2d 503 (1940), re-
hearing denied 285 N.Y. 614, 33 N.E. 2d 547 (1941). Gasoline that had seeped into a
sump pit ignited. Accord: Schwab v. Rubel Corp., 286 N.Y. 525, 37 N.E. 2d 234 (1941).
An unenclosed shaft in dense smoke was termed an "unusual hazard."
59 Canmpbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 723, 194 At. 873 (1937). Accord: Smith
v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 83 N.H. 439, 144 Atl. 57 (1928).
e
0 Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. 358 (1899).
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Although the owner is sovereign over his land, he has the duty to con-
sider the safety of all those who, having the right or privilege to enter
his premises, may be expected to enter it. The "commonly accepted form-
ula in America" that divides those to whom this obligation is owed into
"licensees" and "invitees" depends upon whether their right to enter is by
virtue of permission or of invitation.6' If such is the case, it seems illogical
to hold, as most courts have, that a fireman cannot be an invitee because
there has been no invitation, but that he can be a licensee even though
there has been no permission.62
If we accept benefit to the landowner as the determining factor of the
invitee, it is equally difficult to see on what basis it can be held that a fire-
man is a mere licensee. 63 It is absurd to say that a fireman who comes to
extinguish a blaze in the defendant's building confers no benefit on the
defendant.64
Perhaps the real reason why firemen seem to be set apart as a class to
whom no duty is owed to inspect and prepare the premises is that they
enter at unforseeable moments, upon unusual parts of the premises, and
under circumstances of emergency, where care in preparation cannot
reasonably be looked for. As Professor Bohlen has stated:
It would be an obviously unreasonable burden to impose on landowners to
require them to keep the whole of their premises in such condition as to make
every part of it safe for those whose unusual and exceptional right of entry may
never accrue.... IT]he balance of social benefits can[not] require such a serious
restriction on the owner's use of his land, or justify the imposition of such a
burden on his exchequer, to prevent so vague a risk of so improbable an injury.65
61 Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their
Own Right, 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 142, 237, 340 (1921).
62 Are Firemen & Policemen Licensees or Invitees?, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1157 (1937).
63 Ibid., at 1160.
64Prosser, Torts § 78 at 461 (2d ed., 1955); Prosser, Business Visitors & Invitees,
26 Minn. L. Rev. 573, 608-611 (1942).
65 Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 61, at 350-51.
EXCLUSIVE SALES RIGHTS GIVEN TO REAL
ESTATE BROKERS
When a real estate broker is employed to sell property, one of two
types of agreement is entered into; the first being a general listing where-
by the broker is given the bare right to sell the owner's property with the
broker receiving a commission for producing a purchaser. The second is
a so-called "exclusive" agreement of one kind or another whereby the
broker is given the exclusive agency to sell, or exclusive right to sell, for
a stipulated period of time- the broker's commission being due when or
if a purchaser is found.
